Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 1
Issue 2 Winter 2005

Article 4

January 2005

Policy Changes Needed in the Federal Rules of Evidence
Donald Paine
The University of Tennessee College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Paine, Donald (2005) "Policy Changes Needed in the Federal Rules of Evidence," Tennessee Journal of
Law and Policy: Vol. 1 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol1/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Volunteer, Open Access, Library Journals (VOL Journals),
published in partnership with The University of Tennessee (UT) University Libraries. This article has been accepted
for inclusion in Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy by an authorized editor. For more information, please visit
https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp.

Policy Changes Needed in the Federal Rules of Evidence
Cover Page Footnote
the University of Tennessee College of Law. He served as President of the Tennessee Bar Association and
has been elected to membership in the American College of Trial Lawyers. '357 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2004).

This article is available in Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol1/iss2/4

FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

263

Policy Changes Needed in the Federal Rules of Evidence
DonaldPaine*
Let's start with how federal sausage is made. Recently,
I read that the chief policymaking body supervising rule
drafting has 26 federal judges and no practicing lawyers.
None. The committees voting on revisions have few
practitioners and many judges, professors, and government
employees. The legal geniuses in Congress made
significant revisions in the evidence package sent over from
the Court in 1972, delaying the effective date until January
2, 1975. It's little wonder that the Federal Rules of
Evidence need changing. Here are some suggestions.
Rule 103(a)(2) should require the lawyers making an
offer of proof to state the specific evidence principle
justifying the offer. Part (a)(1) contains such a requirement
for objections.
Should Rule 404(b) be amended to specify whether
"person" applies only to the accused in a criminal trial?
The Circuits are split, as outlined in the recent Sixth Circuit
decision, UnitedStates v. Lucas.1 If the other crimes
exclusion is limited to accused defendants, then defense
counsel is free to prove criminal conduct of other suspects
to prove character conforming conduct tending to exonerate
the accused client. Also, civil trials would not be covered
by the exclusionary rule. "Person" would seem to include
folks other than the accused, but either a rule change or a
Supreme Court ruling is needed.
Whether a claim is "disputed" under Rule 408 at the
time of a compromise offer is unclear. If I am in a car
* The author is a Knoxville lawyer who teaches Evidence each
fall at
the University of Tennessee College of Law. He served as President of
the Tennessee Bar Association and has been elected to membership in
the American College of Trial Lawyers.
'357 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2004).
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wreck and offer to settle on the spot, is the claim disputed?
There probably will be threats and a lawsuit later. Why
should the policy to ban evidence of settlement offers not
apply to my situation?
Meet the Honorable Susan Molinari and her pet Rules
413, 414, and 415.2 When she was in Congress, her vote
was sorely needed on some languishing legislation. In
exchange for that vote, Molinari required the passage of
rules allowing unconditional admissibility of other crimes
to prove character and conforming conduct in criminal and
civil trials involving sexual assault or child molestation.
Her silly rules became the federal law of the land. Note,
sausage lovers, that the Supreme Court had no involvement
whatsoever. A delicious critique can be found in 159
F.R.D. 95 (1994). Luckily most of these criminal
prosecutions are brought in state courts, but Rule 415
affects many federal and civil trials.
Rule 606(b) could use some work. Assume the jury is
hung on liability or guilt. A juror suggests a coin toss to
break the deadlock, and all agree. The choice is heads for
the plaintiff and tails for the defendant, or heads for the
United States and tails for the accused. Despite wringing
of academic hands in treatises and law review articles, the
trial judge is forbidden to even consider juror testimony or
affidavits at a motion for new trial hearing. The rule bars
inquiry into "any matter... occurring during the course of
the jury's deliberations." The same would apply if a civil
jury hung on damages reached a quotient verdict as a
compromise.
There's not much wrong with Rule 609(a) as written,
although it's poorly drafted, but the Supreme Court wrote
two ridiculous opinions that need reversal through a
redrafted rule. In Luce v. United States, the United States
2 Susan

Molinari was a Member of Congress representing New York
from 1990 to 1997.
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Supreme Court held that an accused who does not take the
witness stand has no appellate standing to complain of a
trial judge's flat out wrong in limine ruling that a
conviction is admissible to impeach. 3 So post-Luce I
should put my willing client on the stand and bring out the
erroneous impeaching conviction on direct to soften the
blow, right? Nope, said the Court in Ohler v. United
States.4 I must let the government introduce the conviction
on cross; otherwise I have no standing to complain on
appeal.
Speaking of the dearth of trial lawyers on federal rules
committees, compare the brief time in the legal trenches of
Supreme Court justices. A colleague of mine places the
average at around seven years in real law practice. Reckon
I was qualified for the highest bench after only seven years
of combat? Not hardly.
Why should the scope of cross-examination be limited
to issues raised on direct, as required by Rule 611 (b)? The
cross-examiner can later call the witness at the next stage of
proof, although that may cause problems via witness
hostility. But a witness with knowledge of facts relevant to
material issues should be required on cross to tell the jury
about them then and there.
Rule 612 is not even a rule of evidence, but rather a
discovery rule. It needs radical redrafting to codify the
common law technique for refreshing recollection.
Moreover, the provision permitting court-ordered
production of a document shown the witness "before
testifying" is unfair. If a Rule of Civil or Criminal
Procedure permits discovery, so be it, but remove this
language from the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Of all the policy decisions made by the judicial and
legislative drafters, the most wrongheaded was to classify
3469 U.S. 38, 43 (1984).
4 529 U.S. 753 (2000).

3

266

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY VOL I:

2

some hearsay statements as "not hearsay." The following

are listed in Rule 801(d):
* inconsistent statements sworn to at a hearing,
* consistent statements not to rehabilitate,
* statements of identification,
* opposing party admissions.

Each of these fits the definition of hearsay in Rule 801 (c):
"...a statement, other than one made by the declarant while

testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." So why call hearsay
"not hearsay"? The sainted Irving Younger was probably
correct in guessing that the drafters wanted the world to
know they read Wigmore, who argued that admissions
don't trigger hearsay dangers. 5 How precious. These
exceptions should be moved to Rule 803.
Lingering on admissions a moment longer, consider
Rule 801 (d)(2)(D) on statements by agents and "servants."
For these to be trustworthy offers against the
party/principal, the assertion should be against the agent's
interest. Statements by employees that drip with selfserving motive and cast blame on coworkers or the boss
should be excluded as untrustworthy. They come marching
in, however, under the only two rule requirements:
existence of the agency relationship and subject matter
within the scope of agency.
Before we leave "not hearsay," let us compare Rules
803(7) and 803(10) with Rule 801(d). These exceptions
cover the absence of an entry in a business record of public
record to prove that an alleged fact never existed. But how
is the absence of a statement a "statement" under the

5 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1476, 352, and n. 9 (J. Chadboum rev. ed.
1974).
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hearsay definition? It is not, and these two bogus
"exceptions" should be eliminated.
Rule 803(1) contains an unnecessary untrustworthy
exception for statements of present sense impression. The
declarant describes an event while perceiving it "or
immediately thereafter." Until 1975, only Texas bought
6
into this theory through Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis,
which was once in all evidence casebooks. There Sally
Cooper was heard to say as a Plymouth sped past her on the
highway: "They must be drunk; we'll find them
somewhere on the road wrecked if they keep that rate of
speed up."'7 The two passengers who heard the words
testified. Sally also testified. Aside from the dubious
relevance, there was utterly no need for the hearsay, as
jurors had the nonhearsay testimony of three witnesses
concerning speed. But the court held reports of "presentsense impression" should be admissible as an exception to
the hearsay rule. Academics loved the holding and added
this ingredient to federal sausage.
Subparts (B) and (C) of Rule 803(8) are in need of
tinkering or elimination. Statements in public records are
admissible to prove matters where a public official had a
legal duty to observe and report. So far so good. Then
there is an exception in (B) for criminal cases, where
reports containing rmtters observed by police and "other
law enforcement personnel" are inadmissible hearsay.
Why should those same reports be admissible in a civil
trial? If they are untrustworthy in criminal trials, they are
untrustworthy, period.
Rule 803(8)(C) has been construed to apply to official
investigative findings that are far from "factual." Beech
Aircraft Corporationv. Rainey8 held admissible a JAG
report opining that the cause of a Navy plane crash was
6 161
7 Id.

S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1942).
at 476.
'488 U.S. 153, 170 (1988).
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pilot error. Surely the plaintiff, widower of the allegedly
negligent pilot, would like an opportunity to cross-examine.
Even purely "factual" findings of government flunkies are
often based on multiple hearsay from declarants not under
an official duty to report truthfully. This part of Rule 803
should be deleted. If it is kept, it should be amended to
conform to Beech Aircraft.
The common law limited the ancient documents
exception to statements in 30-year-old property documents.
Not so in Rule 803(16). Now any document, not just a
property document, that is at least 20 years old can be
introduced to prove the truth of statements therein. That is
loony. Take the pre-Jayson Blair rag of record way back
on January 2, 1894, two years before Adolph Ochs rescued
it from the brink of bankruptcy. The headline on page 1
screamed, "Hillmon Tells His Story: The Murderer Found
in the Mountains of Utah." That false statement would be
admissible as true in a federal trial 110 years later. If
getting to the truth depends on the accuracy of such a world
class joke as The New York Times, heaven help us.
A frequently used ground of unavailability is that the
declarant's trial attendance cannot be procured by a
summons. Rule 804(a)(5) contains a silly difference for
three exceptions, primarily the declaration against interest
exception. In order for us to introduce a statement against
interest, we must demonstrate that we were unable to
subpoena the declarant for trial or to depose the declarant
("the declarant's attendance or testimony"). Since we can
depose folks nationwide in federal suits, the two-pronged
requirement eliminates this type of unavailability for the
exception unless the declarant simply can't be located.
That's why virtually all federal precedents involve
declarations against interest by declarants who invoked the
first unavailability ground by taking the Fifth.
Language in Rule 804(b)(1) defining former testimony
allows a civil litigant to introduce a transcript against a

6
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party who was not present at the prior hearing if a
predecessor in interest was present. Some circuit courts
have construed "predecessor in interest" to include anyone
who had a similar motive to examine the declarant. An
example of this construction is found in one of my
appellate losses, Clay v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.9 Such
a holding ignores both the language in the Rule and the
legislative history. As Justice Thomas emphasized in
United States v. Salerno,0 courts are not at liberty to ignore
what a rule plainly states. The person or entity at the
former hearing must indeed be a predecessor in interest and
must have had both an opportunity and a similar motive to
examine the declarant. Clay is therefore no longer good
law, but the predecessor in interest garbage should still be
thrown out.
Finally, we have the residual exception in Rule 807. It
allows federal judges to let in hearsay that goes beyond
even the goofy exceptions discussed above. This rule
should be stricken from the books. While it does exist,
however, the objecting lawyer should remind liberal jurists
that the final sentence conditions the use of this exception
on pretrial notice of intention to offer the statement, the
"particulars" of the statement, and name and address of the
declarant. Consequently, it is illegal to use this exception
as a last-minute fallback position.
Federal practice would be a better world if all or most
of the changes suggested above were made. Do I think that
will happen? Not unless the manufacturing process for
sausage is radically altered. It won't be. Too many egos
would get hurt.

9 722 F.2d 1289 (6th Cir. 1983).
1" 505

U.S. 317, 322 (1992).
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